We present a logic for analyzing cryptographic protocols. This logic is based on a uni cation of four of its predecessors in the BAN family of logics, namely those given in GNY90 , AT91 , vO93b , and BAN itself BAN89 . The logic herein captures the desirable features of its predecessors and more; nonetheless, as a logic it is relatively simple and simple to use. We also present a model-theoretic semantics, and we prove soundness for the logic with respect to that semantics. We illustrate the logic by applying it to the NeedhamSchroeder protocol, revealing that BAN analysis of it may lead to inappropriate conclusions in some settings. We also use the logic to analyze two k ey agreement protocols, examining an attack on one of them.
Introduction
In the late eighties Burrows, Abadi, and Needham developed BAN logic BAN89 , which quickly became the most widely used and widely discussed formal method for the analysis of identi cation authentication protocols, particularly authenticated key distribution protocols. There have since been a number of papers noting BAN's inability or limited ability to reason about some features of both protocols and attacks on protocols. This has led several authors to propose alternatives to BAN. Many of these proposed alternatives are essentially extensions. These extensions yield an increase in reasoning power; however, collectively they accomplished this via a large number of linguistic and logical additions. As a result, one may be left unsure about the assumptions and meanings implicit in the application of these logics. Perhaps more signi cantly, one becomes increasingly unsure about the soundness of the reasoning that results. Relatedly, the simplicity that was part of BAN's basic appeal is lost.
Parts of this paper appeared in prelimary form in vO93 and SvO94 .
This paper presents a logic that encompasses three of these logical expansions, those presented in GNY90 , AT91 , and vO93b . Henceforth these logics will be referred to as`GNY',`AT', and`VO', respectively. And, since these are essentially expansions, this logic encompasses BAN itself as well. GNY and AT add to and reformulate BAN to better reason about the same class of protocols. VO adds rules to reason about key-agreement protocols. Our logic captures the desirable features of those logics. However, rather than simply tacking together the notation and rules from all of these we adopt an integrated approach, designed to yield a logic that is sound with respect to a single, relatively simple model of computation. Thus, this paper also presents a semantics underlying these logical expansions. 1 This will be of manifold advantage. First, some of these logics, including BAN itself, have been questioned before for lacking an independently motivated semantic foundation. Cf., e.g., Syv91 . Amongst other things, such a foundation can give us assurance that the reasoning in the logic is sound i.e., false conclusions cannot be derived from true premises. BAN was essentially given such a semantic foundation by Abadi and Tuttle in AT91 . The model of computation and semantics herein is motivated by Abadi and Tuttle's but di ers from it in fundamental ways. Second, having a fairly detailed model eliminates much of the confusion that can arise over the meaning of formal expressions and or the applicability of logical rules. That is, since we can look at the semantic interpretation of an expression, we can make better decisions about whether that expression really says what we intend to say in a given circumstance. This helps in the protocol idealization step of a BAN or BAN-like analysis. Analysis in this paper does not include idealization per se. More on this at the appropriate point. Third, by serving as a common semantics, it allows us to 1 We refer here to a model theoretic semantics for a logic. This is not to be confused with a semantics for computer programs, which is generally any mathematical interpretation formal or informal of programming constructs.
view the extensions from a single perspective. Contrary to rst appearances, this need not result in an overly complex logic. For, as a unifying model for comparison, it allows us to see what aspects of each logic can be captured by others and what not. There is thus a fair amount of syntactic reduction since primitives of one language are often de nable in another. On the logical level there is a similar amount of axiom chopping. The result is a logic that is surprisingly simple.
In the next section of the paper we present a formal language and logic, and we describe the procedure whereby these are to be applied in protocol analysis. Henceforth this logic will be called`SVO'. In x2, we give a basic description how to analyze protocols using the logic. We then analyze the well known Needham-Schroeder Protocol, henceforth`NS', as an example NS78 . This analysis demonstrates our analysis technique. It also allows us to compare our approach to that in BAN89 , in particular to examine a new observation, a misleading result that can be derived by using BAN analysis on the NS protocol. This highlights some of the advantages of SVO. In x3 w e present a model of computation and a semantics for the language presented in x1, and we prove that the logic is sound with respect to the semantics.
In x4 we apply SVO to two key agreement protocols, one from MTI86 labelled`A0', and the STS protocol from DvOW92 . We derive that the protocols satisfy certain desirable goals and examine a potential attack on A0. Finally, w e present our conclusions and some directions for future work in x5.
The appendices give our arguments that SVO captures the expressive and deductive p o wers of GNY and VO. In appendix A we look at the language and logic of GNY in comparison to SVO. In appendix B we l o o k a t the language and logic of VO in comparison to SVO. In particular we consider in these sections how to capture in SVO the linguistic expressibility and logical derivability of GNY and VO. In so doing we also give de nitions in SVO of useful expressions from the languages of those logics. We do not present a separate section for comparative discussions of AT. AT is the only previously given logic with a model-theoretic semantics. Comparisons between AT and SVO syntax require a semantic context as well, and, in the interest of brevity, w e will not give a presentation of the full Abadi-Tuttle semantics. We therefore make comparative comments at appropriate points throughout xx1 and 3. The rules and axioms of AT, GNY, and VO are summarized in appendices C E for handy reference.
Syntax
We will now present a logic capturing the desirable properties of BAN, AT, GNY, and VO that is both sound and relatively easy to use. Our presentation follows the structure of AT91 , with some important di erences.
The Language
We begin with a de nition of our language. Following Abadi and Tuttle, we re ect that we are looking at abstract protocols and are hence representing the sending of messages composed of expressions in a language rather than mere bitstrings. However, we expand the language slightly to cover, e.g., public keys, functions, and message comprehensibility. We also contract the language by doing away with separate syntax for forwarded messages and for binding messages to shared secrets. The rst is eliminated because we have no current use for it. The second is eliminated because its contributions are captured in our language by other means.
We assume the existence of a set of primitive terms, T , containing a number of sets of constant symbols representing principals, shared keys, public keys, private keys, numerical constants, etc. We also include a set of symbols, f 1 ; 2 ; : : : g to represent unrecognized received messages or message fragments. We actually require two formal languages, one for messages and one for formulae. Only formulae can be true or false or have a principal's belief attributed to them. On the other hand, some messages are not formulae, e.g., a message consisting of a name and a nonce. In particular, no term is a formula, and vice versa. References to the language of SVO are meant to encompass both languages.
Messages and formulae of the language are built from T by m utual induction. The language of messages, M T , is the smallest language over T satisfying:
SVX;K;Y is a formula when X and Y are messages and K i s a k ey. P sees X, P received X, P says X, P said X, and freshX are formulae when X is a message and P is a principal, :' not-' and '^ ' and are formulae if ' and are formulae other connectives are de nable in the usual manner 2 , P believes ' and P controls ' are formulae when ' is a formula and P is a principal.
Most of the expressions just given either are standard usage in BAN and its derivatives or should be intuitively clear. We give a brief intuitive description here for those that may not be.`P controls '' indicates that P is a trusted authority on '. If P says ', then ' is so.`P K $ Q' indicates that K is a symmetric key shared exclusively by P and Q. No one other than P or Q will ever encrypt messages using K, and only P, Q, and those they trust e.g., a server who might generate it know K.`PKP;K' is used similarly for public keys. K is P's public key, and`K ,1 ' is used exclusively to refer to the corresponding private key.`PK P;K', PK P;K', and`PK P;K' are for encryption, signature, and key agreement k eys, respectively. Keys themselves may o r m a y not have subscripts. 3 Typically, k eys and nonces have mnemonic subscripts, e.g., A K ab ! B.
SVX;K;Y' refers to signature veri cation. It says that, given signed message X, applying K to it as a signature veri cation key veri es Y as the message signed with the corresponding private key. The meaning in our semantics of all expressions will be discussed below in x3.2.
A few more notes on notation: Typically`fXg K ' is meant to refer to transformations of X using K. We mean speci cally to include shared and public key encryption under this notation. We nd the following notation useful for giving a uniform presentation of the axioms. e K is the complement of key K. In public key ciphering schemes, K ,1 is the complement of K, and K is the complement of K ,1 . In shared key schemes A ,! B'. In our primitive notation, ' is of course :' _ Men87 . 3 In BAN89 , the public key and shared key notations for indicating key appropriateness were more similar. We h a ve followed the notational conventions of GS91 and vO93b . In the presence of three types of public keys, we nd this to be the best compromise between familiarity and readibility. F urther issues that lead to this choice of public key notation are discussed in appendix B. K = e K. Unless restricted, either explicitly or implicitly by context,`K' will refer below t o a n y symmetric, private, or public key. We can always treat encryption and decryption as functions parameterized by the relevant k ey. Thus, we can generalize this notation to`e F', expressing the complement of a function F. This notation assumes that we are referring to an e ectively oneone injective function, that is, a function such that it is computationally di cult to nd pairs of arguments mapping to the same value, whether or not that value is given. It does not assume that either the function or its complement inverse is feasibly computable in practice. Some previous BAN logics have used expressions such as`fXg K ' to represent digital signatures as well as encryptions. If one uses simple RSA exponentiation with a private key for signatures, then it is possible to treat a digital signature as simply the inverse of public key enciphering. Thus, given the public key, e K, one can recover X from fXg K , and the notational choice is somewhat natural. We instead use` X K ' to represent message X digitally signed using key K. In most modern signature schemes it is not possible to recover X from the signature itself, even if one possesses e K. Thus, signing is not in any reasonable sense the inverse of encryption. To make clear that we are assuming a standard signature scheme without message recovery we have adopted this notation.` X K ' refers to the signed message, not just the signature. Therefore, anyone in possession of X K is automatically in possession of X. Throughout the paper ' and are metalinguistic symbols used to refer to arbitrary formulae. , is a metalinguistic symbol referring to sets of formulae.
The SVO Logic
Our logic is a modal logic Che80 . It has two inference rules:
Modus Ponens: From ' and ' infer .
Necessitation: From`' infer`P believes '.`' i s a metalingusitic symbol. 4`,`' ' means that '
is derivable from the set of formulae , and the axioms as stated below.``'' means that ' is a theorem, i.e., derivable from axioms alone. We describe derivability i.e. proofs below in x2. Axioms are all instances of tautologies of classical propositional calculus Men87 , and all instances of the following axiom schemata 5 :
Believing For any principal P and formulae ' and , 4 The symbol``' is usually pronounced turnstile". The symbol j =', to be introduced, is pronounced double turnstile". K. In saying`PK Q; K' we assume enough redundancy in the signature scheme to preclude attackers possessing only K from producing a valid signature for Q on any message, meaningful or otherwise. This feature is designed into most modern signature schemes.
Precise meaning is set out in x3.2.
By de nition, all symbols in the axioms are symbols of the languages speci ed above, F T and M T . Thus, in particular, the X in these axioms is a message not a bitstring. But, a key can be applied by anyone who has it to any bitstring to yield another bitstring. This apparent incongruity is handled in our language by the unrecognized message symbols f 1 ; 2 ; : : : g, which will be discussed more below. The superscripted Q in axiom Ax3 indicates that the message is from Q rather than P. Ax10. P received X P sees X Ax11. P sees X 1 ; : : : ; X n P sees X i Ax12. P sees X 1^: : : P sees X n P sees FX 1 ; : : : ; X n Here F is meta-notation for any function feasibly computable in practice by P, for example, X 1 + : : : + X n .
There is no axiom for seeing corresponding to axiom Ax8 for receiving, i.e., P sees fXg K^P Saying A principal who has said a concatenated message has also said and sees the concatenates of that message. A principal who has recently said X has said X.
A principal sees what he says.
Ax14. P said X 1 ; : : : ; X n P said X i^P sees X i Ax15. P says X 1 ; : : : ; X n P said X 1 ; : : : ; X n ^P says X i Jurisdiction This axiom in e ect says that P's word is law for the ' in question.
Ax16. P controls '^P says ' ' Freshness A concatenated message is fresh if one of its concatenates is fresh, and any e ectively one-one function F including encryption and decryption of a fresh message is fresh.
Ax17. freshX i freshX 1 ; : : : ; X n Ax18. freshX 1 ; : : : ; X n freshF X 1 ; : : : ; X n The function F in axiom Ax18 must be genuinely dependent on the fresh component. For example, if X 2 is fresh, then X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 is fresh; however, the value of X 1 + 0 X 2 + X 3 is not. Speci cally, a function is genuinely dependent on an argument if computing the value of the function is infeasible without the value of that argument.
Nonce-Veri cation Freshness promotes a message from having been said sometime to having been said during the currentepoch.
Ax19. freshX^P said X P says X Symmetric goodness of shared keys A shared key is good for P and Q i it is is good for Q and P.
In this section we give a brief description of our syntactic protocol analysis technique, which is somewhat similar to the techniques associated with previous BAN logics. A major di erence is that we do not idealize the protocol. What`idealize' means will be explained in the next subsection. Syntactic analysis comes in two main steps. First, we set out premises that re ect assumptions based on the protocol description. Second, we prove desired goals using those premises together with the axioms and rules of the logic. These steps are typically carried out against a background of goals the protocol is intended to meet. Should we fail to prove one or more of these goals, we may w ant to add the step of considering why the protocol fails to meet its goals. This may include looking for possible attacks. Relatedly, we may semantically analyze our premises to see if any of them can be false in a run of the protocol. Semantics is discussed below i n x3.
Premises can typically be grouped into four types. First are initial assumptions, those things assumed to be true at the start of the protocol. Examples include each principal's belief in the freshness of nonces it generates, the goodness of long term keys principals share with servers, the jurisdiction of a server over the quality and freshness of keys it sends, etc. Also included are premises re ecting a principal's comprehension of terms it simply has without receiving them during the current protocol run and premises re ecting a principal's comprehension of relevant signature veri cations. Syntactic analysis of the type just described is all that is available using BAN, GNY, and other logics without an independent semantics. AT and SVO add another level to this by providing an independently motivated modeltheoretic semantics. In addition to other values, this allows one to do semantic analysis of the protocol. One advantage of this is a rigorous means of assessing the truth of initial assumptions and other premises. Problems arising from initial assumptions, as in the Nessett protocol Nes90 , are thus addressible using these logics. Cf. Syv92 for a detailed discussion. We n o w l o o k a t a speci c example to illustrate our analysis technique.
The Needham-Schroeder Protocol
NS is a typical protocol for key distribution to two principals via an on-line authentication and key distribution server NS78 . It is also a standard example for analysis because it is subject to an attack that has long been well known DS81 . The protocol is as follows: In the rst message A tells the server that she would like to obtain a session key for talking with B, and she includes a nonce, N a , for S to include in his response thus 6 Our choice to characterize proofs in this way has important repercussions for other features of the logic. In AT, since every line of a derivation must be a theorem of the logic, it is necessary for analysis to restrict consideration to good" runs where, e.g., negations do not occur within belief operators in initially held beliefs. We need place no such restrictions. These restrictions are not present i n A T91 simply to make derivations sound; they have other motivations as well, which w e will not discuss.
identifying it as a response. In the second message, S sends A the session key, K ab , B's name indicating that it is for a session with B, and A's nonce. He also includes a message encrypted with a key S shares with B consisting of the session key and A's name to show that the key is for talking with A. The whole second message is encrypted with a key that S shares with A. A decrypts the message, and, if the nonce and B's name agree with the message she sent, she forwards the portion encrypted for B to B in message 3. B decrypts this to obtain the session key. He then generates a nonce and encrypts it with K ab and sends this to A. A decrypts the nonce and subtracts one from it to distinguish thenal message from a simple re ection of message 4, which could be from anyone. She then encrypts this with K ab and sends it to B.
Analysis of the NS protocol
The rst step in analyzing the protocol is to set out the assumptions that we make based on the protocol speci cation. These will serve as premises, which we will use together with the axioms and rules of the logic to derive conclusions. Generic assumptions include each principal's belief that the nonces it generates are fresh, belief that the server has jurisdiction over the freshness and goodness of session keys it sends, and belief that the long term key it shares with the server is good. These premises preclude automated analysis because they typically vary from protocol to protocol even for a message with the same speci cation. Mao and Boyd have a BAN-like formal method that does allow for full automation MB93 . They accomplish this by requiring that the protocol be speci ed in their own language, at a much greater level of detail than usual. In a sense, they thus incorporate the idealization into the specication. GNY does something similar in its message interpretation rules.
Note that, in P14, for B to believe he has received fN b ,1g K ab it is not enough that he receive the message that he interprets to say this; he must also believe he has received the previous message in which S told him K ab . Without the previous message, he would not have the key and could not recognize it as a candidate key for speaking with A.
We can now proceed with our formal derivation of goals using SVO. In the interests of brevity, w e will compress many of the proof steps together, and we will not cite the use of propositional reasoning used in giving the justi cation for derivation lines. The rst derivation is of goals for A. We will discuss some typical goals for protocols in x4.1. The goals we derive here are that A believes the distributed key is good for talking with B line 5 and that A believes the distributed key is fresh line 6. In the justi cation of each line in any derivation,`Axn' refers to axiom Axn of our logic,`Nec' to the Necessitation rule, and`MP' to the Modus Ponens rule. We n o w discuss the results of our analysis and contrast them with those of the analysis of NS in BAN89 . We feel that the above analysis is about as simple as the one in BAN89 . While there can be no objective measure of this, we emphasize that the proofs in BAN89 are sketchier than the above. This may lead to an appearance of greater simplicity. We n o w turn to the premises of each analysis.
P1 P4 constitute a subset of the assumptions given in BAN89 . The BAN assumptions also include assumptions about the server's belief in the quality of the long term keys and the quality and freshness of distributed session keys. While reasonable, they are unnecessary for the analysis given in BAN89 or the one herein, so we have left them out. It is interesting to note that, even if unnecessary, these assumptions are more natural in the context of BAN analysis since it is there necessary to derive that A believes S believes A K ab ! B in order to derive A believes A K ab ! B. These assumptions thus attest to the consistency of such a second order belief with the rst order belief that is its object. In other words, if these assumptions of rst order belief are true, then the corresponding second order beliefs cannot be incorrect. In our analysis, this second order belief is replaced with the more conservative formula A believes S says A K ab ! B. Nonetheless, note that assumptions such a s P2, which are common in such analysis, can be somewhat dangerous vO93a . The assumptions in BAN89 also include the assumption that B believes the session key to be fresh. As noted by Burrows et al., this is a dubious assumption that overlooks the possibility of attacks in which an old, compromised session key is used, such as in the Denning-Sacco attack. It is included in BAN89 not because the authors think it is justi able, but to illustrate that a desirable protocol goal cannot be reached without it. P5 P8 re ect the messages that each principal receives.
These directly re ect the speci ed protocol without any interpretation of message contents, as would occur in idealization. They correspond to premises based on the protocol annotation step of analysis in BAN89 ; although in a BAN analysis, protocols are annotated only after idealization. As would typically be the case, these premises play no role in our proofs; however, they do play a role in our analysis by helping us to see what the following premises should look like. P9 P11 do not directly correspond to anything in BAN analysis, except perhaps to global assumptions about the recognizability of messages. They re ect which parts of received messages receivers can tie back to originally understood message components or to each other. P12 P14 re ect how receivers interpret received messages in the context of the given protocol. They are typically the hardest premises to produce, sometimes requiring awareness of intended application and con-text in addition to the protocol speici cation. These correspond roughly to idealization and annotation in BAN89 . There, idealization interprets the meaning of messages, and annotation allows the assumption of a premise expressing that the receiver received the idealized message he was sent. The BAN approach i s t ypically a little less explicit. This lack of explicitness naturally engenders less detail of expression hence greater simplicity in appearance. The idealization of NS from BAN89 , expressed in our notation, is as follows: Suppose that the NS protocol runs properly through the sending of the third message, but an attacker intercepts this message so it is never received by B. In place of message 4, the attacker simply sends a random string of the appropriate length. A then`decrypts' this string using K ab . Since there is nothing in the message that is recognizable to A, she cannot tell whether the result is a nonce sent b y B. So, she subtracts one from the result, reencrypts it with K ab , and sends it to B as message 5. This is also intercepted by the attacker. According to the analysis in BAN89 , after a run of NS A believes that B has expressed faith in the quality of K ab . But, in this attack B is not even present.
Thus, the derivation is misleading with respect to both entity authentication and mutual belief in the quality of a shared key. This attack is much easier to implement than the Denning-Sacco attack since it does not require any k ey compromise in order to succeed. As already noted, however, it is not an attack on intended protocol goals. We also hasten to note that it falls explicitly outside the scope of the analyses in BAN89 . In BAN89 , there is a blanket assumption that e ach encrypted message contains su cient redundancy to allow a principal who decrypts it to verify that he has used the right k ey." pp. 5 6 There is thus no aw i n t h e analysis of NS therein. Further, the blanket assumption is frequently, if not universally, a reasonable assumption to make. In particular, the attack w ould not be possible in many modern implementations of the protocol. In practice encryption often contains a mechanism to check that when decrypted the correct decryption key was used, for example, including a hash of the message content along with that content inside the encryption. This is not represented in the NS protocol speci cation; though it would be trivial to do so. Even though the blanket assumption pushes protection against such attacks outside the scope of BAN89 , it is certainly possible to represent the protection mechanisms in question at the speci cation level of BAN89 . And, there are protocols for which i t is inadvisable to include the redundancy generally assumed in BAN89 . For example, cf. BM92, BM93 . Thus, it is better to represent such mechanisms in the speci cation whenever they are actually intended.
We have focussed on equating sender's and receiver's meaning in a BAN analysis as opposed to an SVO analysis. There is another feature of SVO analysis that is equally important to uncovering the limited applicability of NS for entity authentication of B to A: our requirement that premises explicitly set out what principals comprehend. This immediately brought out that A does not comprehend N b in this protocol. Thus, a result showing that A understood anything by receiving message 4 would have to be incorrect. Note also that our logical derivations do not themselves lead to our discovery. Rather we are only able to prove limited results because the relevant premises make assumptions only about a receiver's interpretation of a message. The inability to prove desired goals in this case is one factor in uncovering the inapplicability o f N S for entity authentication of B to A. As noted by the philosopher of mathematics Imre Lakatos, sometimes the virtue of logical proof is not that it compels belief but that it suggests doubt. We discuss some typical goals that protocols might b e i n tended to meet in x4.1.
Finally, though we have entirely replaced idealization, we do not claim to have removed the possiblility o f e rror in interpreting the meaning of messages. What we have replaced idealization with is further assumptions premises for each protocol. And, though the latter may seem more complicated, we are simply being explicit where analogous reasoning was done implicitly in BAN analysis. It is still possible to incorrectly assume that receipt of a given message in a given context implies that a certain content has been received. Relatedly, our model-theoretic semantics can be used to rigorously, albeit informally, e v aluate the truth of all premises.
3 Semantics for SVO
Model of Computation
Computation is performed by a nite set of principals, P 1 ; : : : ; P n , who send messages to one another. In addition there is a principal P e representing the environment. This allows modelling of any penetrator actions as well as re ecting messages in transit. The environment's state consists of a global history, a set of transformations available to the environment, and a message bu er m i for messages sent to P i and not yet received. We limit the set of runs to those where a given message can only be received after it is sent.
Thus, if receiveX is in the local history at r i t, then sendX;G is in the local history at some r j t 0 , where t 0 t .
As mentioned, transformations on a message are implicitly made when that message is sent or received. For example, if a principal receives an encrypted message fXg K and he has e K, then he has also received X.
Speci cally, the set of explicitly received messages for a principal P i at a point r; t contains the following: 1 all messages X such that receiveX appears in the local message history at or prior to t, 2 the concatenates of any concatenated received message, 3 any message X for which fXg K is a received message and appropriate application of e K is an available transformation for P i , and 4 any message X for which X K is a received message for some K. Note that under this de nition, if P i receives an encrypted message and later acquires the decryption key, the decryption is a received message at that later point in the run.
For a given principal P i , the collection of all messages that are explicitly received, newly generated, or initially available to P i implicitly de nes a set of seen messages for him at that point. 7 This consists of the messages just mentioned plus all the messages he can recursively produce from those messages via his available transformations up to the limits of his computational capabilities. Rather than being explicit, some received messages are highly contextual. For example, we saw in the Needham-Schroeder protocol that receiving a random number in a certain context could be interpreted as implying receipt of a session key and even of statements about the session key. In fact the received message need have n o explicit connection to the implicit message at all. The full set of received messages for a principal P i at a point r; t includes the explicitly received messages plus any such implicitly received messages. While anything might be implied by a message, the implicitly received messages for P i at r; t are limited to the seen messages for P i at r; t . Similarly, our model is restricted to runs where principals can only send what they see. Thus, if sendX;G is in the local history at r i t, then X is in the seen messages at r i t.
The said messages are also a subset of the seen messages; we cannot hold a principal responsible for saying everything that is derivable by him from things he said. For example, if A sends fT a ; K ; C g K ab to B, we should infer that A said T a ; K ; C . However, even though we can infer that A sees C sees K from this action, we should not infer that A said C sees K based on 7 The set of seen messages, and the sets of received and said messages to be de ned presently, will be slightly expanded below.
Cf. the discussion under Believing in x3.2.
it. Given a message M that P i sends at r; t , we dene the said submessages of M by recursively adding to fMg the following: 1 the concatenates of all concatenated submessages of M, 2 the unencrypted message of any encrypted submessage of M for which P i has the encryption key and for which h e sees the unencrypted message, 3 the unsigned message in any signed submessage of M for which P i has the signature key and sees the unsigned message, and 4 the unhashed message in any hashed submessage of M for which he sees the unhashed message. 5 any message M 0 such that P i sees M 0 and P i meant to imply M 0 by s a ying a submessage of M. Implicit in saying that P i has the key or hash function in the above is that P i also possesses an algorithm that is feasibly computable in practice by him and that produces the relevant transformation. The set of said messages for P i at r; t is the union of the sets of said submessages of all messages that P has sent i n r through time t.
Truth Conditions
We now set out the conditions under which a formula is assigned to be true. We begin by xing a system, i.e. a set of runs, R. Truth of a formula ' at a point r; t , written`r; t j = '', is inductively de ned below.`j = '' means that ' is valid true at all points.
Logical Connectives r; t j = '^ i r; t j = ' and r; t j = r; t j = :' i r; t = j = ' 8 Receiving r; t j = P received X i X is in the set of received messages for P at r; t , as de ned in x3.1. Seeing r; t j = P sees X i X is in the set of seen messages for P at r; t , as de ned in x3.1. Saying r; t j = P said X i , for some message M, at some time t 0 t in r, P sent M and X is a said submessage of M for P at r; t 0 . This gives the truth conditions for P having said X at some point in the past. We also characterize what in means for P to have said X in the current epoch typically taken to mean since the initial point of the current protocol run. r; t j = P says X 8` r; t = j = '' means it is not the case that r; t j = '.
i , for some message M, at some time 0 t 0 t in r, P sent M and X is a said submessage of M for P at r; t 0 . Jurisdiction r; t j = P controls ' i r; t j = P says ' implies r; t 0 j = ' for all t 0 0.
Note that jurisdiction constitutes authority at all points in the current epoch, not just at the time P says '.
This makes it a very strong property. Attributions of jurisdiction are typically part of initial assumptions and should be made sparingly and judiciously.
Freshness A message is fresh if it has not been part of a message sent prior to the currentepoch. It is su cient but not necessary for freshness that a message be unseen prior to the currentepoch. A principal might generate a message earlier and not send it until the epoch begins. Truth conditions are thus in terms of the what has been said rather than what has been seen. r; t j = freshX i , for all principals P and all times t 0 0, r; t 0 = j = P said X. Keys We will give truth conditions with respect to four types of keys: shared keys, public ciphering keys, public signature keys, and public key-agreement k eys. Truth conditions for a shared key to be good for communication between P and Q is a variant of that in AT91 : r; t j = P K $ Q i , for all t 0 , r; t 0 j = R said fX Q g K implies either r; t 0 j = R received fX Q g K , or R = Q and r; t 0 j = R said X and r; t 0 j = R sees K. If r; t 0 j = R said fXg K instead of the stronger r; t 0 j = R said fX Q g K , then R 2 fP;Qg instead of the stronger R = P. PKP;K' means both that K is a public key associated with principal P and that the corresponding private key, K ,1 ,isgood. We refer here to all three types of public keys. The truth conditions below are thus for both good public key binding and private key secrecy. We do not mean to imply each principal has only one of any type of public key; however, our notation does assume a unique private key associated with any public key. Signing and ciphering encryption may be separated in the case of public keys. Thus, the two sets of truth conditions for these two types of public keys separate out those features from the shared key truth conditions. The rst truth conditions for public keys are for signature keys. Because a principal may come to have beliefs based on a signed message that he cannot produce himself, we need a way to refer to the result of verifying the origin of that message. r; t j = SVY ;K ;X i there exists a e K such that it can be veri ed using K that Y = X e K . Note that the truth conditions for SVX;K;Y are not contextual. They hold at one point i they hold at all points. Thus, we are implicitly assuming that the relevant signature veri cation algorithm is in A i for all principals P i at all points. With this in place we can give the truth conditions associated with public key signature keys.
r; t j = P K P;K i , and all t 0 , r; t 0 j = Q received Y^SVY ;K ;X implies r; t 0 j = P said X.
Next we give truth conditions for public ciphering keys. r; t j = P K P;K i , for all t 0 , r; t 0 j = Q sees fXg K implies r; t 0 j = Q sees X only when Q = P.
Truth conditions for key-agreement k eys are a bit more complicated: r; t j = P K P;K i for all t 0 , 1 for some Q and K q , r; t 0 j = P tees that there is someone with whom P using K can form a good key. The second clause guarantees that anyone with whom P using K cannot form a good key cannot form a good key with anybody at least not using that public key. The truth conditions for PK P;K may seem overly complex. But, we cannot simply require that a session key P produces via agreement with the public key of any Q is good. This is because, even if K were still secret, any given Q's private key-agreement key may have been compromised, compromising F 0 K;K q . On the other hand, we cannot simply require that if P cannot produce a good session key by agreement with Q, then Q has a bad private key-agreement k ey. That would lead us into a circularity in determining whether truth conditions are satis ed. The above characterization achieves what is needed while avoiding circularity. These truth conditions are admittedly complex. One might try to decompose the logic into elements with simpler semantics. However, key agreement i s complicated stu . What our current logic and semantics allow u s to do is ignore much of that complexity in our syntactic analysis while knowing that what we h a ve i s nonetheless sound. Decomposition would just lead us into algorithm or protocol speci c details that should beavoided on the logical level.
Believing Our characterization of belief is based on possible worlds. This approach t o c haracterizing belief was rst given by Hintikka in Hin62 . Since the early eighties it has been applied to distributed computing one example of such application being that in AT91 . The idea is that a principal's beliefs in a given state are determined by which w orlds global states are considered to be possibly the state he is in. From his perspective these worlds are indiscernible from one another. For each principal P i we can thus de ne a relation i that indicates for each w orld r; t which w orlds are possible in this manner for P i . Not surprisingly, this is closely tied to the messsages that are comprehended by P i at each w orld, those that he can discriminate to be what they are. The messages that a principal can comprehend are those that he can ultimately tie back to cleartext he has seen and those that he can relate to previously seen messages. The local state for a principal includes a set of seen messages; however, some of these he will see without comprehension. For example, if he sees a hash HX but not X, then he does not comprehend what he's seeing to be HX. Similarly, if he sees fXg K , but does not have the relevant decryption key, then he does not comprehend what he is seeing even if X is available plaintext. Nonetheless, we account for the possibility of, e.g., a principal recognizing that a received message is the encryption with his public key of a message he had previously forwarded without comprehending.
We will now de ne the comprehension of principal P i in a run r. Note that while principals necessarily decompose received messages top down, it will facilitate understanding if comprehension of messages is set out in a bottom up manner. Since public keys are assumed to be generally available and since principals can therefore verify the structure of messages signed by others even if they cannot form those messages, we m ust somehow account for this. We therefore de ne a set A + i to be A i together with the formation of messages that P i can verify such as signatures by other principals. Henceforth Cl i ' refers to the closure of the set under the rules in A + i . Let comp i r; 0 consist of the closure under A + i , of all plaintext that P i has at the start of the protocol in run r. We assume that each principal P i receives at most one message at a time. If P i receives no messages at time t in r, then comp i r; t = comp i r; t , 1.
Suppose that P i receives M at r; t . Let be the set of all hereditary submessages of M that P i can form or verify at r; t . In other words includes the immediate submessages of M, the submessages of submessages, and so on, down to the atomic terms contained in M that are contained in Cl i fMg comp i r; t , 1.
Some of the members of will not be understood by P i .
We will now proceed through an iterative construction that will replace any X 2 that is not understood by P i with x . Consider all the X 2 that are atomic X 2 T . If X 2 comp i r; t , 1, then let X 2 0 . If X = 2 comp i r; t , 1, then let x 2 0 . Also, let comp i r; t , 1 0 . Let 0 be the result of substituting x for X in any submessage of a memberof if x 2 0 . Now, consider all the X 2 0 such that X is the result of a single message formation rule as given in x1.1 and where the components of the X are members of 0 . If P i can form or verify X with A + i using those components, then let X 2 1 . If P i cannot form or verify X with A + i using those components, then let x 2 1 . Also, let 0 1 . Let 1 be the result of substituting x for X in any submessage of a memberof 0 if x 2 1 . Consider all the X 2 1 such that X is the result of a single message formation rule as given in x1.1 and where the components of the X are members of 1 . If P i can form or verify X with A + i using those components, then let X 2 2 . If P i cannot form or verify X with A + i using those components, then let x 2 2 . Also, let 1 2 . Let 2 be the result of substituting x for X in any submessage of a memberof 1 if x 2 2 .
Continuing in this way, we will eventually arrive at a stage n for which the only X 2 n,1 under consideration is M itself, with asterisks substituted for appropriate submessages. Either this message is replaced by a n asterisk expression at stage n or n = n,1 . In either case, this is the terminating stage for the construction. We can then de ne comp i r; t = Cl i n Note that this construction determines what is comprehended not just for hereditary submessages of a message M just received but also previous messages. For example, suppose P received fXg K at r; t but only acquired K at some point r; t 0 where t t 0 . fXg K would be replaced by an asterisk expression in comp P r; t . But, assuming X were comprehended, fXg K would appear in comp P r; t 0 .
We can use this construction to form a local message M i r; t for any message M and any principal P i and point r; t . Note that in this construction each submessage of M, including M itself, occurs in . And, each j contains a unique element corresponding to each element o f . Thus, given any message M received or not, seen or not we can construct the local message M i r; t for P i at r; t by following the above construction to form the relevant substitutions for subexpressions of M until we construct n . M i r; t is simply the element of n corresponding to M in . This construction is only relevant t o comp i r; t when M is a message newly received or generated by P i .
We now expand the sets of seen, received, and said messages to include the locally understood messages.
Henceforth, if M is in the set of seen said, received messages for P i at r; t , then so is M i r; t . For any given run r and principal P i we n o w de ne the locally comprehended run r i to be the same as r i except that wherever any message M occurs in r i t, for any t, M i r; t replaces M.
The possibility relation i for a principal P i in state r; t is de ned by r; t i r 0 ; t 0 i , r i t and r 0 i t 0 can be produced one from the other by a uniform substitution of subscripts on asterisks. For example, r i t might be the same as r 0 i t 0 except that j occurs in the former everywhere that k occurs in the latter, and vice versa. We can now give truth conditions for belief formulae:
r; t j = P i believes ' i r 0 ; t 0 j = ' i r 0 ; t 0 for all r 0 ; t 0 such that r; t i r 0 ; t 0 , and ' = ' i r 0 ; t 0 for some such r 0 ; t 0 .
In the sequel we may occasionally write` p ' and comp p ' respectively for the possibility relation and comprehension of principal P. Similarly we may writè M p r; t ' to represent the local message corresponding to M for P at r; t .
It is obvious that i is an equivalence relation. By a standard result of modal logic this means that all of the axioms of the system S5 are valid in this semantics Che80, Gol92 . Readers familiar with the use of logics of knowledge and belief will recognize this as the most standard logic for representing knowledge. And, such readers may therefore wonder why we have chosen to take this as a logic of belief and why w e h a ve included only two of the axioms of S5 in our axiom set. We see no need to include the other axioms for the applications we e n vision. It is a simple matter to add them should it be necessary. The subtleties of intuitions regarding knowledge and belief in the context of protocol analysis have been discussed elsewhere Syv91, Syv92 , and we will not delve i n to that issue here. This completes the conditions necessary to assign truth values to all formulae in the logic.
Soundness
Theorem 3.1 SVO is sound: if ,`', then , j = '.
In words, the theorem says that, for a set of formulae , and a formula ', if ' is derivable from ,, then ' is true at any world making all of , true. Thus, in a typical protocol analysis, if , refers to the premise set, as described in x2, then the e ect of this theorem is that if all our assumptions , are true, then so is any protocol goal ' proved from those assumptions. The truth of the assumptions must be evaluated by means outside the logic, e.g., by e v aluating their status in the model of computation via the semantics.
Proof: This is a typical tedious soundness proof Che80 : show that the axioms are valid true at all worlds and that derivation preserves truth. Proof of validity for all axioms is direct by inspection of the truth conditions given in x3.2. We ll in details for those axioms where the result is neither immediate nor standard. Note that all the axioms for which the validity proof is spelled out below are conditionals. By the truth conditions for` ', it therefore su ces to show i n each case that the consequent of the conditional is true at any world at which the antecedent is true. Ax1 Ax2. As noted above i is an equivalence relation, and axioms Ax1 and Ax2 are thus valid by a standard result of modal logic Che80 .
Ax3. P K $ Q^R received fX Q g K Q said X^Q sees K Suppose that r; t j = P K $ Q^R received fX Q g K .
By the de nition of a run, there is a t 0 t such that r; t 0 j = R 0 said fX Q g K for some R 0 . Then, by the truth conditions for P K $ Q, either r; t 0 j = R 0 received fX Q g K or r; t 0 j = R 0 said X, r; t 0 j = R 0 sees K, and R 0 = Q. In our model of computation each run is assumed to have an initial state. Thus, each sent message must be sent a rst time without being previously received. So, there exists a t 00 t and R 00 such that r; t 00 j = R 00 said fX Q g K and r; t 00 = j = R 00 received fXg K . So, r; t 00 j = R 00 said X, r; t j = Q sees K, and R 00 = Q. In this section we l o o k a t t wo k ey agreement protocols. These protocols are often subtler in many ways than standard key distribution protocols. Thus, while these analyses are commensurately subtler than those of, e.g., BAN89 , they also illustrate the relative strength of SVO. Some expressions from VO are useful in these analyses. Whenever notation from VO is encountered it should be read as a syntactic abbreviation as de ned from SVO primitives in appendix B.1. Before beginning analysis of the protocols themselves we set out some generic formal goals that any authentication protocol might b e i n tended to meet. Similarly, we set out some generic assumptions. In our analysis, we prove that each of the protocols meets some of the generic goals presented.
Generic Formal Goals and Assumptions
We list rst some generic goals that protocols to be discussed below will be shown to meet. This is not meant t o b e t a k en as a de nitive list of the goals that a key agreement o r k ey distribution protocol should meet.
G1. The intuitive meaning and reasons for each of these should be clear for the most part. G1 says that A believes B has been online during the current epoch. In G2, N a is A's nonce, and F is assumed to be an e ectively one-one function such that F is computable in practice by B and F or e F is computable in practice by A. The idea is that A is assured that B has recently o ered the response`X' t o A's challenge of N a .
No other understanding of`entity authentication' is intended. Note that it is still possible for G3 to hold if B has not participated in the protocol and even if B does not possess session key K.
We n o w collect some generic formal assumptions, some of which will be made in the analysis of the protocols considered below. They are stated for a principal A and a trusted authority T. In a protocol involving two principals A and B, they may be assumed for either or both principals. A1. T's signature key: A believes PK T ; K t A2. T's signature key jurisdiction:
A believes T controls PK B;K b
A3. T's agreement k ey jurisdiction:
A believes T controls PK B;K b 9 As mentioned above, notation from VO is de ned from SVO primitives in appendix B.1.
A4. Own agreement k ey quality:
A believes PK A; K a
A5. Nonce freshness: A believes freshN a
The meaning of all these assumptions should be self evident: principals believe they have good signature keys for trusted authorities, that trusted authorities have jurisdiction over statements concerning the public keys of other principals, that their own agreement k eys are good, and that nonces they generate themselves are fresh. As noted in x2.2.1, jurisdiction assumptions are rather strong and should be made with caution. When issuing a certi cate, it is generally important that the relevant authority con rm not only the authenticity o f the request but also that the requesting principal possesses the corresponding private key. If this were not true for signature or key agreement certi cates, then the relevant juridiction assumption would not be true either. The signi cance of this will become apparent presently. This is not meant to be a comprehensive list of assumptions for any t ype of protocol.
The MTI Protocol A0
The key agreement protocol A0 of Matsumoto, Takashima, and Imai MTI86 results in the establishment of a shared secret key; two Di e-Hellman exponentiations are used, combining xed and per-run variant parameters, allowing the creation of a unique key for each protocol run while reusing certi ed public key-agreement k eys. A publicly known appropriate prime p and primitive element in GFp are xed. The parties A and B and the trusted authority T use a common signature scheme in association with certicates; s U f g denotes the signature of party U. In a preliminary, one-time process, A selects a secret random number x, computes R a = x , and gives this to T; T veri es A's identity and returns a certi cate Cert a consisting of R a , a distinguishing identi er I D a for A, and T's signature over their concatenation. R a serves as A's xed public key-agreement k ey, which can now b e This protocol is also discussed in Yac90 , where calculations are with respect to an RSA modulus n rather than modulo p as above. Another very similar protocol was given in Gos90 .
Analysis of A0 protocol
We rst specify the protocol in our notation: We now turn to formal derivations. In the interest of brevity, we will compress many of the steps together, and we will not cite the use of propositional reasoning in giving the justi cations for derivation lines. Since there is nothing in the protocol to authenticate either principal to the other in any way, there is no hope of deriving the generic goals G1, G2, G4, o r G6. We give formal derivations of goals G3 and G5 beginning with G3 A believes A K, ! B. As Burrows et al. found in their analyses in BAN89 , it is often instructive to look at the assumptions necessary to derive a goal. We h a ve noted before that jurisdiction assumptions are powerful and should be made judiciously. We thus delve more deeply into premise P4. First note that the quality and binding of the entire agreement k ey is assumed based only on the trusted authority's assertion concerning the long term part and the comprehensibility of the fresh part. This is an unavoidable assumption since the fresh part of each public agreement k ey is sent only in the clear. If this cleartext were attacked it could result in principals believing that they share a good session key. This attack in no way invalidates the above result since A does have K, and K is a session key good for at most A and B though in actualitygoodfornobody, if the attacker tampers as indicated above.
Another assumption implicit in P4 is, however, more serious. Speci cally, P4 and more generally A3 assumes that the trusted authority has jurisdiction over the binding and quality of a principal's agreement k ey. This is the danger we alluded to above if the trusted authority issues a certi cate without checking both that the certi cate matches an authenticated request and that the requesting principal has the corresponding private key.
In this protocol, should T issue certi cates without this con rmation, it would be possible for a principal E to trick another principal B into thinking he has formed a session key with E when B has in fact formed a session key with A. In this case the above result would be spurious. Here is an account of the attack. A slightly more complicated attack h a ving similar results is given in MQV95 .
Attack on the A0 Protocol A's public signature key K a and proceeds. 9. Analogously, B veri es the authentication signature of A by decrypting Token ab , and checking the signature on it using K a and knowledge of the expected pair of data R a ; R b .
The protocol is successful from each party's point of view if signature veri cation succeeds on both the received certi cate and authentication signature. In this case, the protocol provides assurance that a shared secret has been jointly established with the party identied in the received certi cate. Figure 2 provides a summary of the messages exchanged, and actions taken, by each of the parties in this protocol.
Analysis of STS protocol
The speci cation of the STS protocol in our notation is as follows: We include in the premise set generic assumptions corresponding to A1 trusting the authority's signature key, A2 trusting the authority's jurisdiction over signature keys, A4 trusting the quality one's own agreement key, and A5 trusting the freshness of one's own agreement k ey. As with the MTI protocol A0, in the STS protocol it is assumed that the trusted authority has timeless jurisdiction over signatures; thus, we cannot use A2 as stated above. The appropriate variant is trivial to determine and appears as premise P3 below.
We s a w in analyzing the A0 protocol the subtlety o f jurisdiction assumptions. For reasons similar to the ones discussed in connection with the attack on A0 above we cannot allow principals to have jurisdiction over the quality and binding of their own agreement k eys. That is, we cannot unless other protections are in place, e.g., in the case of STS a signature or keyed hash. However, some related assumption is necessary if we are to derive any results about the quality of the session key K. believes that someone other than herself said it. Given that A believes P K A; R a , A can also con rm that K = b x , hence that b is a public agreement k ey.
We will independently, formally derive below that A believes B's signature key to be good for B. The rst possibility is implicitly assumed not to have occurred. Similarly, it is assumed that no one other than B has B's private signature key. And, the second possibility is ruled out by an argument similar to that in the last paragraph. Hence A is justi ed in inferring that B produced the received message and therefore that P K B; b . A similar argument justi es the corresponding assumption for B.
We also assume that honest principals are competent to use the public keys they generate for a protocol run only within that run and to properly execute the protocol. In practice this allows us to assume a principal can recognize the messages sent b y the other principal in the protocol as not having originated with herself. This is re ected in the premise set as P10.
Finally, the premise set includes the usual assumptions about what principals received, what they comprehend, and how they interpret received messsages. We n o w e n umerate the premise set. Goal G1 is a special case of G2, which is derived in line 14. G3 is derived in line 8, G4 in line 11, and G5 in line 9. A similar proof shows that all of these goals are formally derivable for B from the same premise set.
There is no possibility of deriving G6 mutual understanding of shared key for A. However, it would be possible to derive G6 for B with a minimally revised premise set. It is a standard part of BAN idealization to interpret the rst message from a principal employing appropriate use of a shared encryption key as including the assertion that the key is good for the relevant principals. Thus, we might add a premise allowing B to interpret receipt of f a ; R b K ,1 a g K as implying receipt of f a ; R b ; A K $ B K ,1 a g K . This would be su cient t o allow the derivation of G6 for B. But, as always with such i n terpretations, we must be very careful. Recall the earlier discussion regarding problems hidden by assumptions in the idealization of NS. It would be incorrect to so interpret the message from B to A. By the end of a successful protocol run B believes he has a goodkey for communication with A; nonetheless, until he receives the last message he has no guarantee that it is A with whom he is establishing a key. He has received nothing from A when he sends his message except a cleartext number that should appear random to him. Presumably he also has an indicator of who sent the number, but this is not assumed to be protected in any way. Thus, it would be wrong for A to interpret B's message as including an assertion from him that B K $ A.
This could only be reasonably stated by B in a further message, subsequent to the last one he receives in this protocol. In Low96 L o we constructs an attack" on STS. It is an attack because A believes that B thought that he B was talking to A." p. 165 The above discussion shows that such could not constitute an attack on STS because this was never a goal of the protocol, nor was it stated to be in DvOW92 . In fact, in vO93b i t w as noted that such a n eager belief" on A's part should be taken as unveri ed since it assumes B's reception and processing of the third message. But, in the Lowe attack on STS, B does not complete the protocol. A is entitled to infer entity authentication of B G2, and this remains true in the attack Lowe constructs. But, A is not entitled to conclude that she has mutual understanding with B G6 o r a n ything similar.
Conclusions and Further Study
In this paper we have presented a logic that encompasses four of its predecessors in the BAN family. We have also presented a model-theoretic semantics for our logic with respect to which it is sound. Despite adding expressiveness and axioms su cient to reason about all the properties of cryptographic protocols to which these four predecessors are addressed, it is no more syntactically complex than any of them. In fact, measured by the number of rules or axioms and their relative simplicity, it is less complex than GNY, AT, and VO. And, it has about the same number as BAN. In sum, we b elieve this logic to be about as simple to use as any of those from which it is derived; yet it is more expressive than any of them. Indeed, our analysis of the NeedhamSchroeder protocol compares favorably in simplicity t o the one in BAN89 . It also uncovers a previously unnoticed feature of the NS protocol. This led us to more precisely delimit application context assumptions and goals for the protocol than did either the original NS78 or the analysis in BAN89 . We have also analyzed two key agreement protocols. The structure of these is rather subtle and analysis commensurately more complex than for simple key distribution protocols of the type analyzed in BAN89 . Nonetheless, we used the logic to derive a number of desirable goals for the protocols analyzed. And, by taking a closer look at the assumptions necessary to derive those goals, we were lead to nd an attack on one of them. We reiterate that one of the virtues of formal protocol analysis is that it forces one to fully set out the formal assumptions necessary for a derivation. And, one of the virtues of a model-theoretic semantics is that it presents a mathematically rigorous setting in which to evaluate the truth of those assumptions. We h a ve not looked at all the logics that have been derived from BAN, e.g., MB93 . That logic is a contraction rather than an expansion of BAN. It is designed to allow m uch that is informal in the analysis process to be automated. In particular we h a ve not discussed logics that express either time or message ordering. The goals of these logics are somewhat more ambitious than those discussed above. One of those goals is to address more types of replay attacks. BAN is only directed at classic replays, i.e., replays of messages originally sent before the current protocol began. GNY, with its notoriginated-here syntax, adds the ability to reason about some replay attacks using messages from within the current protocol run but still does not address interleaving attacks, that is attacks involving replay of messages from at least two contemporaneous protocol runs. Cf. BGH + 92 , DvOW92 , Sne92 , Car93 . Indeed, none of the logics discussed in this paper generally addresses interleavings at all. One might, nonetheless, uncover an interleaving attack by coincidence in the course of analysis using one of these logics. The point is that there are no features of these logics that address such attacks. Failure of methods such as BAN logic to address interleaving attacks has led some to focus on the notion of current protocol run rather than on freshness. However, this still leaves some types of replays unaddressed e.g., the rst attack presented in Syv93b . We also have not explored the relationship between di erent BANlike logics that reason about time e.g., GS91 or the relationship they have to logics that allow reasoning about message ordering e.g., KG91 . Our suspicion is that the logics of GS91 and KG91 can be captured by the logic of this paper with the temporal additions of Syv93a .
Finally, w e h a ve not looked at the still more ambitious project of unifying the BAN family with other types of logics. Nonetheless, we h a ve produced a uni ed BANlike logic that captures the features of four other BANlike logics. We h a ve approached this from the perspective o f h a ving an integrated model. The result is more than a collection of tools. Indeed, we believe i t t o b e a better instance of all the tools it contains.
Sne92
Einar Snekkenes. A.1 GNY Notational Additions P X : P is told X. This is expressed in our syntax as P received X'. P 3 X: P possesses, or is capable of possessing X. This is expressed in our syntax as`P sees X'. P j X: P once c onveyed X. This is expressed in SVO as`P said X'. X: X is fresh. This is expressed in SVO as freshX'.
X: Recognizability of X. In GNY rules this only occurs in the context of someone's belief. This is consistent with the reasonable requirement that recognizability be tied to an individual, rather than considering what is recognizable to everyone. We will express this relativization in SVO b y translating expressions of the form P j X in GNY as P believes P sees X. This is relativization is discussed below when we l o o k a t G N Y recognizability rules.
P X: P is told a formula that he did not convey previously in the current run. This is captured in SVO as`P received X: P says X'. Note that the SVO expression is actually broader than the GNY expression.
It says that P did not say X since the start of the current run, whether within the run or not.
X ; C: These are called message extensions. They are used in conveyed messages to indicate conditionality o f an assertion. They are only used logically in connection with GNY J2, one of the jursdiction rules. We defer comment to the section below where we discuss this rule.
It is interesting that we w ere unable to give translations for some of the GNY formulae without referring to the corresponding logical rules. This is because, beyond a minimal intuitive explanation, any technical meaning that GNY expressions hold is tied up with the logic.
A.2 GNY Logical Rules
We will look at these rules with the following question in mind. Once we have made an appropriate translation to SVO syntax, is there a logical derivation in SVO of the conclusion of a rule from its premises? If so, then the rule expresses a result that is syntactically captured in SVO. Hence, we know that it is also semantically captured by our model of computation because of soundness. When we s a y that a GNY rule is derivable in SVO below w e mean that the answer to the question just asked is yes.
GNY Rationality Rule
This rule says that whenever we can infer C2 from C1, we can also infer P j C2 from P j C1. It falls out of the modus ponens rule and axiom Ax1.
GNY Being Told and Possession Rules
All of these rules are obviously derivable in SVO except T5. T5 says that P Y follows from P F X;Y and P 3 X. F is taken to be a many-to-one computationally feasible function that is one-to-one computationally feasible if either X or Y is held constant, as is its inverse.
GNY90 , p. 235. It is di cult to assess such a rule in general, but Gong et al. do provide one example of the type of function they have in mind, viz: exclusiveor. Our discussion of T5 thus follows their example. If we view exclusive-or as encryption, then T5 can be viewed as a general statement of T3, which says that P Y follows from P fY g X and P 3 X. However, care must be taken in such cases because, when exclusive-or is used for encryption, fXg Y = fY g X . Strictly speaking, in our language this is only true when both X and Y are keys since fXg Y is only well-formed when Y is a key. Nonetheless, according to T5 in GNY, if P receives X Y and P possesses both X and Y , then, P has been told X and been told Y . There may be applications for which this is a reasonable inference, but the example shows why w e might not want t o h a ve T5 as a logical rule. Often, if not virtually always, we would like to distinguish a message sent from attendant parameters, such a s k eys used to encrypt the message. However, T5 obliterates this distinction by treating the arguments of F symmetrically. Furthermore, such symmetry can serve as the basis of attacks that allow a penetrator to deduce keys from chosen, known, or guessed plaintext| for example, the Simmons attack on the TMN protocol discussed in TMN90 . This example does not serve a s a similar basis for criticism of T3. The symmetry in the encryption algorithm subjects it to direct attack. This violates the general assumption of all logics discussed herein that encryptions are not breakable by direct attack to reveal either the plaintext or the key.
GNY Freshness Rules
All of these rules are derivable in SVO except F5 and F6. F5 says that a principal's belief in the freshness of a private key follows from his belief in the freshness of its public cognate. F6 expresses the converse inference. There is no reason in practice to question these rules; however, there is also no harm in practice in leaving them out since public keys are usually long term and not distributed on line. They thus do not generally play a role in freshness considerations. F11 is only derivable in SVO assuming R6, which will be discussed shortly.
GNY Recognizability Rules
All of these rules are derivable in SVO except R6. This rule says that P j X follows from P 3 HX. But, from the mere possession of HX, P should not form any beliefs about X; without X, h e m a y not know that he is seeing HX rather than some other message or even just a random bitstring. R6 as given in GNY is thus too strong, although perhaps only with respect to this intuition. If we replace the statement that P believes X is recognizable with a claim that X is recognizable by P we get a more reasonable conclusion.
However, we have no formal means to directly represent this in either SVO or GNY. SVO does have the expressive capability to indicate that a principal recognizes a given bitstring as the same one that yielded the hash he received in a previous message, which appears to be the intended e ect of R6. Recall that GNY only expresses recognizability in the context of belief, e.g., P j X, and this is the GNY formula for which w e have provided an SVO translation. Indeed, as the above discussion shows, our treatment allows us to capture the e ects of GNY recognizability with weaker logical rules.
GNY Message Interpretation Rules
We do not attempt to handle all of these, on general grounds of logical unwieldiness and inelegance. We make an admittedly arbitrary division by addressing only those rules containing less than ve premises. Once appropriate translations have been made, these are derivable in SVO except for the second conclusion of I4: P j Q j fXg ,K . We s a w no practical value of such a conclusion. Should this be incorrect, Q said X K ,1 can be added to the consequent of axiom Ax4. Similar addition can be made to axiom Ax3. This logic remains sound with respect to the semantics given in x3. As mentioned earlier, some BAN logics assume message recovery from signatures. GNY does not actually even explicitly discuss signatures. I4 and I5 are meant t o b e used with public key encryption schemes such as RSA, where ffXg K ,1g K = X. In claiming that we can capture the reasoning of these rules, we are assuming in our translation that a more common scheme for which message recovery is not possible is being used rather than one such as they describe.
GNY Jurisdiction Rules
Like A T, SVO separates belief from everything else, including trust. This is useful and perhaps the only way one is likely to maintain a model-theoretic semantics. The only jurisdiction rule actually axiom in SVO is the same as in AT, viz: P controls '^P says ' '. GNY J1 is taken directly from BAN's jurisdiction rule. BAN also has only one rule in this category. Nonetheless, BAN's rule is not derivable from the above nor valid in the semantics. This is no great loss since the only iterated beliefs we generally care about are derived from things that one principal says to another. In other words, the above axiom captures what we need from J1. BAN and GNY must express jurisdiction in terms of belief since that is their only way to capture a principal's actions in the current epoch. A more detailed discussion of this is given in AT91 , x3.2.
As Gong et al. say p. 240 that J3 is just a special case of J2, we focus on J2.
From P j Q j Q j , P j Q j X ; C, and P j X, infer P j Q j C. This rule introduces new notation not discussed elsewhere.`P j Q j Q j ' captures the idea that P believes Q to be honest Q only says what he believes and competent Q understands the implications of what he says. This can be translated directly to the following SVO syntax expression: P believes Q says X^X C Q believes C.
The second premise of the rule can also be translated directly to SVO: P believes Q said X^X C.
And, the third premise is the same in GNY and SVO, except for an irrelevant notational di erence. Similarly, the conclusion of the rule is the same in GNY and SVO. So, the rule is entirely expressible within the SVO syntax. Furthermore, it is not only sound but an easy logical derivation in SVO.
B Relation to VO extensions
The rst paper to introduce the capability to reason about key agreement, e.g., Di e-Hellman exchanges, to a BAN-like logic is vO93b . Some of the notation and rules intoduced therein arise naturally in such protocols, but they are also applicable to shared and private key protocols as discussed in the above papers. The technique of the last paragraph allows us to capture key con rmation entirely without adding explicit conrmation syntax to SVO. However, there is a hidden informal assumption in such an approach. We can only use it if we systematically employ meta-rules for premise formation. Instead of explicitly using the con rmation axioms C1 C3 of vO93b we must, in e ect, always employ those axioms in premises of this type i.e., receiver's interpretation premises. On the other hand, if we add the VO notation and rules, there is no need to
give, e.g., A's interpretation of receiving fN a g K . We thus have a c hoice. On the one hand is a more streamlined logic and semantics accompanied by more assumptions about message interpretation, while on the other is a more complex logic and semantics accompanied by fewer such assumptions. By far the greatest source of confusion and misapplication of BAN to date has come from slipping dubious assumptions in or leaving necessary assumptions out during protocol idealization. The more formally explicit approach i s t h us safer, but either can be rigorously followed to the same practical e ect. In the next paragraph we will discuss a proposal that combines the advantages of explicit axioms and a simpler logic.
con rmK: Current knowledge of K has been demonstrated. We have been discussing the relative merits of capturing key con rmation via axioms and via direct translation to the syntax of SVO. If we c hoose to follow the latter route, then`con rmK' becomes irrelevant notation. The con rmation axioms make use of recognizability in the sense of GNY. Thus, if we wish to follow the former route, we will have to relativize`con rmK' in just the way that we relativized X' in appendix A.1. For convenience in the following discussion we i n troduce the syntactic shorthand P X P believes P sees X. This would be intuitively too strong if P X were understood as X is recognizable to P. The intuitive reading in what follows might better be rendered as P recognizes X, for which P believes P sees X is a more acceptable approximation. In any case, the following discussion will ultimately obviate this notation. The relativization is thus trivial notationally. For example, VO axiom C3 becomes freshK^ P HK con rm P K We could use this to try to treat con rm P K as a de-! B' below. ned term following the axioms. But this raises some problems. Suppose we i n troduce the following de nition which encompasses C1, C2, and C3: con rm P K freshX^ P fXg K _ freshX^ P MAC K X_ freshK^ P HK If we were then to try to apply this in VO rule R32, we w ould need to verify that A received con rm A K.
Recall that VO follows GNY in using`' to indicate that a message orginated elsewhere, rather than to indicate a message that may not be understood| as in SVO. Unpacking the syntactic de nition this would mean that A received freshX^ P fXg K _ freshX^ P MAC K X_freshK^ P HK. But, since receiving does not distribute across disjunctions, this would never actually be satis ed. Actually this problem exists for R32 even before we attempt to give a de nition: it is clear that in the condition A received con rm A K, A is not meant to see a statement regarding freshness. Rather she is supposed to see a statement that contains a fresh component. In addition there is the open endedness of the axiom list. These axioms were meant to capture three common ways of establishing key con rmation in practice, but others are possible. A fourth would simply involve sending the key K itself in a message; the message would have to be fresh somehow itself if the key K was not known to be fresh. Note that in Di e-Hellman key agreement, it is. So, another axiom would be C4. P K^freshK con rm P K These and similar possibilities can all be represented in SVO b y a single syntactic de nition:
con rm P K P received FX;K^ P F X;K freshX _ freshK Here F is a feasibly computable function, that is effectively one-one. This means it is infeasible to nd any two pairs X;K mapping to the same value. F is required to be one-way in the sense that encryptions, MACs, and cryptographic hash functions would be if and only if it is important that K not be revealed by the con rmation process itself. 11 This also 11 In con rming knowledge of K, the intention is that the key K itself is not revealed. However, in terms of formal de nition, this is irrelevant|what is of import is con rmation only. If a key K is somehow compromised, whether in relation to key con rmation or otherwise, this may violate an assumption about key quality, but that should be treated distinctly from key con rmation.
allows a more general de nition of data con rmation rather than key con rmation. Restricting con rmation to keys seems unnecessary, and it should not be a general constraint that data are not revealed through the con rmation process. Ways of con rming knowledge of information without revealing the information itself is the subject of a large area of research, namely zero-knowledge; this subject is beyond the scope of the present work. Note X can be null, and F could be the identity function, as in C4, the above axiom. We have incorporated`P received FX;K' into the de nition because con rmation is only relevant if someone receives it. Bringing this into the axiom itself avoids the problem of distributing received raised above. We can provide a similar de nition to indicate that P has received con rmation from someone other than herself:
con rm P K P believes P received FX;K:
P said FX;K^freshX _ freshK
The de nition just introduced has a number of advantages. It makes con rmation criteria explicit but constitutes no addition to SVO since it is eliminable, i.e., it can always be replaced by the longer expression that is purely in the language of SVO. We have already dropped in this de nition the notational shorthand of P F X;K. As just indicated, its application goes beyond the current context. It still requires that informal work be done, but the interpretation of protocol messages is as direct as it would be were we to use the axioms from vO93b . A and key agreement PK A; K, PK ,1 A. Unfortunately in the semantics of x3 we were unable to give truth conditions for all of these individually. We h a ve reverted to grouping the binding of a public key together with the quality secrecy of the private key. We t h us use`PKA; K' to mean both that K is the public key associated with principal A and that the corresponding private key, K ,1 , is good. If this is a loss, it is logically speaking a minor one. There are good reasons for separating the two notions. For, there are two distinct kinds of protocol failures here. On the one hand, the secrecy of a private key might be compromised. On the other hand, a principal A might be tricked into thinking that the wrong public key is bound to principal B. The distinction introduced by Gaarder and Snekkenes allows us to di erentiate these failures. Nonetheless, the only logical use of the corresponding expressions occurs in their rule R13, where both proper binding and good private keys 12 We are following convention here by using`K ,1 ' to refer to a private signature key. Some schemes such as RSA can be used for both enciphering and signatures because of invertibility. This makes the notational choice quite natural. However, some signature schemes are not invertible, and for those schemes the notation is slightly deceptive.
are premises of the rule. Actually, what is required is belief therein, but this is aside. This is similarly true for VO's rules. Thus, since both good public binding and good private keys are required for any logical use of these notions, it is su cient to have notation that captures them together. Nevertheless, we a c knowledge that it would be nice to have the requirements syntactically separated for a more direct re ection of the nature of potential failures. Aside from the key con rmation axioms already discussed, VO i n troduces three new logical rules. These are presented in appendix E. They are all derivable in SVO, with the translations discussed above.
C GNY Rules
We present these GNY rules without any explanation of the rules or notation therein. Readers are referred to GNY90 for details.
C.1 Rationality Rule
If C1 C2 is a rule, then for any principal P, so is P j C1 P j C2 .
C.2 Being-Told Rules T1 P X P X T2 P X;Y P X T3 P fXg K ; P 3 K P X T4 P fXg +K ; P 3 , K P X T5 P F X;Y; P 3 X P Y T6 P fXg ,K ; P 3 +K P X C.3 Possession Rules P1 P X P 3 X P2 P 3 X;P 3 Y P 3 X;Y; P 3 FX;Y P3 P 3 X;Y P 3 X P4 P 3 X P 3 HX P5 P 3 FX;Y; P 3 X P 3 Y P6 P 3 K; P 3 X P 3 f Xg K ; P 3 f Xg ,1 K P7 P 3 +K; P 3 X P 3 f Xg +K P8 P 3 , K; P 3 X P 3 f Xg ,K C.4 Freshness Rules F1 P j X P j X;Y; P j F X F2 P j X; P 3 K P j fXg K ; P j fXg ,1 K F3 P j X; P 3 +K P j fXg +K F4 P j X; P 3 , K P j fXg ,K F5 P j +K P j ,K F6 P j ,K P j +K F7 P j X; P j K; P 3 K P j fXg K ; P j fXg ,1 K F8 P j X; P j +K; P 3 +K P j fXg +K F9 P j X; P j ,K; P 3 , K P j fXg ,K F10 P j X; P 3 X P j HX F11 P j HX; P 3 HX P j X C.5 Recognizability Rules R1 P j X P j X;Y; P j F X R2 P j X; P 3 K P j fXg K ; P j fXg ,1 K R3 P j X; P 3 +K P j fXg +K R4 P j X; P 3 , K P j fXg ,K R5 P j X; P 3 X P j HX R6 P 3 HX P j X
C.6 Message Interpretation Rules
We present only I4, I6, and I7.
I4 P fXg ,K ; P 3 +K; P j +K 7 ! Q; P j X P j Q j X; P j Q j fXg ,K I6 P j Q j X; P j X P j Q 3 X I7 P j Q j X;Y P j Q j X C.7 Jurisdiction Rules J1 P j Q j C; P j Q j C P j C J2 P j Q j Q j ; P j Q j X ; C; P j X P j Q j C J3 P j Q j Q j ; P j Q j Q j C P j Q j C
D AT Rules and Axioms
We present these AT rules and axioms without explanation. Readers are referred to AT91 for details. There are two rules:
R1. Modus Ponens: From`' and`' infer`.
R2. Necessitation: From`' infer`P believes '.
Axioms are all instances of tautologies of classical propositional calculus, and all instances of the following axiom schemata:
Believing
For any principal P and formulae ' and , A1. P believes '^P believes ' P believes A2. P believes ' P believes P believes ' A8. P sees fX Q g K^P has K P sees X A9. P sees hX Q i S P sees X A10. P sees`X' P sees X A11. P sees fX Q g K^P has K P believes P sees fX Q g K Saying A12. P said X 1 ; : : : ; X n P said X i A13. P said hX Q i S P said X A14. P sees`X': P sees X P said X If`says ' is substituted for`said ' throughout in A12, A13, or A14, the result is also an axiom. 
